This document is not an OIDF International Standard. It is distributed for review and comment. It is subject to change without notice and may not be referred to as an International Standard.
Recipients of this draft are invited to submit, with their comments, notification of any relevant patent rights of which they are aware and to provide supporting documentation.
The OpenID Foundation (OIDF) promotes, protects and nurtures the OpenID community and technologies. As a non-profit international standardizing body, it is comprised by over 160 participating entities (workgroup participant). The work of preparing implementer drafts and final international standards is carried out through OIDF workgroups in accordance with the OpenID Process. Participants interested in a subject for which a workgroup has been established have the right to be represented in that workgroup. International organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with OIDF, also take part in the work. OIDF collaborates closely with other standardizing bodies in the related fields.
Final drafts adopted by the Workgroup through consensus are circulated publicly for the public review for 60 days and for the OIDF members for voting. Publication as an OIDF Standard requires approval by at least 50% of the members casting a vote. There is a possibility that some of the elements of this document may be subject to patent rights. OIDF shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.
FAPI 1.0 consists of the following parts:
These parts are intended to be used with RFC 6749, RFC 6750, RFC 7636, and OIDC.
FAPI is a highly secured OAuth profile that aims to provide specific implementation guidelines for security and interoperability. The FAPI security profile can be applied to APIs in any market area that requires a higher level of security than provided by standard OAuth or OpenID Connect. Among other security enhancements, this specification provides a secure alternative to screen scraping. Screen scraping accesses user’s data and functions by impersonating a user through password sharing. This brittle, inefficient, and insecure practice creates security vulnerabilities which require institutions to allow what appears to be an automated attack against their applications.
This document is Part 2 of FAPI Security Profile 1.0 that specifies an advanced security profile of OAuth that is suitable to be used for protecting APIs with high inherent risk. Examples include APIs that give access to highly sensitive data or that can be used to trigger financial transactions (e.g., payment initiation). This document specifies the controls against attacks such as: authorization request tampering, authorization response tampering including code injection, state injection, and token request phishing. Additional details are available in the security considerations section.
Although it is possible to code an OpenID provider and relying party from first principles using this specification, the main audience for this specification is parties who already have a certified implementation of OpenID Connect and want to achieve a higher level of security. Implementers are encouraged to understand the security considerations contained in Section 8.7 before embarking on a ‘from scratch’ implementation.
The keywords “shall”, “shall not”, “should”, “should not”, “may”, and “can” in this document are to be interpreted as described in ISO Directive Part 2. These keywords are not used as dictionary terms such that any occurrence of them shall be interpreted as keywords and are not to be interpreted with their natural language meanings.
This part of the document specifies the method of
This document is applicable to higher risk use cases which includes commercial and investment banking and other similar industries.
The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
Part1, FAPI Security Profile 1.0 - Part 1: Baseline
RFC 6749, The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework
RFC 6750 The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage
RFC 7636, Proof Key for Code Exchange by OAuth Public Clients
OIDC, OpenID Connect Core 1.0
RFC 8705, OAuth 2.0 Mutual-TLS Client Authentication and Certificate-Bound Access Tokens
JARM, JWT Secured Authorization Response Mode for OAuth 2.0 (JARM) incorporating errata set 1
RFC 9126, OAuth 2.0 Pushed Authorization Requests
RFC 9101, OAuth 2.0 JWT Secured Authorization Request
ISO/IEC 29100, ISO/IEC 29100 Information technology — Security techniques — Privacy framework
For the purpose of this document, the terms defined in RFC 6749, RFC 6750, RFC 7636, OIDC and ISO/IEC 29100 apply.
| API | application programming interface | |
| CSRF | cross site request forgery | |
| DN | distinguished name | |
| HTTP | hyper text transfer protocol | |
| HTTPS | hypertext transfer protocol secure | |
| JAR | JWT-secured authorization request | |
| JARM | JWT secured authorization response mode | |
| JOSE | javascript object signing and encryption | |
| JSON | javascript object notation | |
| JWE | JSON web encryption | |
| JWK | JSON web key | |
| JWKS | JSON web key sets | |
| JWS | JSON web signature | |
| JWT | JSON web token | |
| MTLS | mutual transport layer security | |
| OIDF | OpenID foundation | |
| PAR | pushed authorization requests | |
| PII | personally identifiable information | |
| PKCE | proof key for code exchange | |
| REST | representational state transfer | |
| RP | relying party | |
| TLS | transport layer security | |
| URI | uniform resource identifier | |
| URL | uniform resource locator |
The OIDF FAPI security profile specifies security requirements for high risk API resources protected by the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework that consists of RFC 6749, RFC 6750, RFC 7636, and other specifications.
There are different levels of risks associated with access to these APIs. For example, read and write access to a bank API has a higher financial risk than read-only access. As such, the security profiles of the authorization framework protecting these APIs are also different.
This profile describes security provisions for the server and client that are appropriate for highly secured APIs by defining the measures to mitigate:
This profile does not support public clients.
The following ways are specified to protect against modifications of authorization responses: Implementations can leverage OpenID Connect’s hybrid fow that returns an ID Token in the authorization response or they can utilize the JWT Secured Authorization Response Mode for OAuth 2.0 (JARM) that returns and protects all authorization response parameters in a JWT.
While the name ID Token (as used in the OpenID Connect hybrid flow) suggests that it is something that provides the identity of the resource owner (subject), it is not necessarily so. While it does identify the authorization server by including the issuer identifier, it is perfectly fine to have an ephemeral subject identifier. In this case, the ID Token acts as a detached signature of the issuer to the authorization response and it was an explicit design decision of OpenID Connect Core to make the ID Token act as a detached signature.
This document leverages this fact and protects the authorization
response by including the hash of all of the unprotected response
parameters, e.g. code and state, in the ID
Token.
While the hash of the code is defined in OIDC,
the hash of the state is not defined. Thus this document
defines it as follows.
s_hash
State hash value. Its value is the base64url encoding of the left-most half of the hash of the octets of the ASCII representation of the
statevalue, where the hash algorithm used is the hash algorithm used in thealgheader parameter of the ID Token’s JOSE header. For instance, if thealgisHS512, hash the state value with SHA-512, then take the left-most 256 bits and base64url encode them. Thes_hashvalue is a case sensitive string.
An authorization server may protect authorization responses to clients using the “JWT Secured Authorization Response Mode” JARM.
JARM allows a client to request that an authorization server encodes the authorization response (of any response type) in a JWT. It is an alternative to utilizing ID Tokens as detached signatures for providing increased security on authorization responses and can be used with plain OAuth.
This specification facilitates use of JARM in
conjunction with the response type code.
NOTE: JARM can be used
to protect OpenID Connect authentication responses. In this case, the
OpenID RP would use response type code, response mode
jwt and scope openid. This means JARM protects the
authentication response (instead of the ID Token) and the ID Token
containing end-user claims is obtained from the token endpoint. This
facilitates privacy since no end-user claims are sent through the front
channel. It also provides decoupling of message protection and identity
providing since a client (or RP) can basically use JARM to protect
all authorization responses and turn on OpenID if needed (e.g. to log
the user in).
API resources may contain sensitive data and/or have increased security requirements. In order to fulfill different security needs, FAPI Security Profile 1.0 defines an advanced profile that is beyond the baseline security requirements defined in the Part 1: Baseline document.
As a profile of the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework, this document mandates the following for the advanced profile of the FAPI Security Profile 1.0.
The authorization server shall support the provisions specified in clause 5.2.2.0 of FAPI Security Profile 1.0 - Part 1: Baseline, with the exception that Section 5.2.2.0-7 (enforcement of RFC 7636) is not required.
In addition, the authorization server
request parameter or by reference with the
request_uri parameter;response_type value code id_token,
orresponse_type value code in
conjunction with the response_mode value
jwt;request or request_uri
parameter;exp
claim that has a lifetime of no longer than 60 minutes after the
nbf claim;nbf
claim that is no longer than 60 minutes in the past; andS256 as the code challenge method.NOTE: MTLS is currently the only mechanism for sender-constrained access tokens that has been widely deployed. Future versions of this specification are likely to allow other mechanisms for sender-constrained access tokens.
NOTE: PAR does not present any additional security concerns that necessitated the requirement to use PKCE - the reason PKCE is not required in other cases is merely to be backwards compatible with earlier drafts of this standard.
EXAMPLE
See Annex A for additional information.
In addition, if the response_type value
code id_token is used, the authorization server
s_hash, in the ID Token to
protect the state value if the client supplied a value for
state. s_hash may be omitted from the ID Token
returned from the token endpoint when s_hash is present in
the ID Token returned from the authorization endpoint; andNOTE: The authorization server may return more claims in the ID Token from the token endpoint than in the one from the authorization response
In addition, if the response_type value
code is used in conjunction with the
response_mode value jwt, the authorization
server
A confidential client shall support the provisions specified in clause 5.2.3 and 5.2.4 of FAPI Security Profile 1.0 - Part 1: Baseline, except for RFC 7636 support.
In addition, the confidential client
request or request_uri
parameter as defined in Section 6 of OIDC in
the authentication request;response_type, client_id, and
scope parameters/values using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax
as required by Section 6.1 of the OpenID Connect specification if not
using RFC
9126;aud claim in the request object as the
authorization server’s issuer identifier URL;exp claim in the request object that has
a lifetime of no longer than 60 minutes;nbf claim in the request object;S256 as the code challenge method if using [PAR];
andclient_id
parameter/value using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax to the authorization
endpoint, as required by Section 5 of [JAR], if using [PAR].In addition, if the response_type value
code id_token is used, the client
openid into the
scope parameter in order to activate OIDC
support;s_hash value is equal to the value
calculated from the state value in the authorization
response in addition to all the requirements in 3.3.2.12 of OIDC;
andNOTE: This enables the client to verify that the authorization response was not tampered with, using the ID Token as a detached signature.
In addition, if the response_type value
code is used in conjunction with the
response_mode value jwt, the client
The FAPI endpoints are OAuth 2.0 protected resource endpoints that return protected information for the resource owner associated with the submitted access token.
The protected resources supporting this document
The client supporting this document shall support the provisions specified in clause 6.2.2 of FAPI Security Profile 1.0 - Part 1: Baseline.
As a profile of the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework, this specification references the security considerations defined in Section 10 of RFC 6749, as well as RFC 6819 - OAuth 2.0 Threat Model and Security Considerations, which details various threats and mitigations. The security of OAuth 2.0 has been proven formally - under certain assumptions - in OAUTHSEC. A detailed security analysis of FAPI Security Profile 1.0 can be found in FAPISEC.
There is no way that the client can find out whether the resource access was granted for a bearer or sender-constrained access token. The two differ in the risk profile and the client may want to differentiate them. The protected resources that conform to this document differentiate them. The protected resources that conform to this document shall not accept a bearer access token. They shall only support sender-constrained access tokens via RFC 8705.
In RFC 6749 and RFC 6750, the endpoints that the authorization server offers are not tightly bound together. There is no notion of authorization server identifier (issuer identifier) and it is not indicated in the authorization response unless the client uses different redirection URI per authorization server. While it is assumed in the OAuth model, it is not explicitly spelled out and thus many clients use the same redirection URI for different authorization servers exposing an attack surface. Several attacks have been identified and the threats are explained in detail in RFC 6819.
In this attack, the client developer is socially engineered into
believing that the token endpoint has changed to the URL that is
controlled by the attacker. As a result, the client sends the
code and the client secret to the attacker, which the
attacker can then replay.
When the FAPI Security Profile 1.0 client uses RFC 8705, the client’s secret (the private key corresponding to its TLS certificate) is not exposed to the attacker, which therefore cannot authenticate towards the token endpoint of the authorization server. However, there is still the potential for a phished code be injected into a different flow involving an honest client.
In this attack, the client has registered multiple IdPs and one of
them is a rogue IdP that returns the same client_id that
belongs to one of the honest IdPs. When a user clicks on a malicious
link or visits a compromised site, an authorization request is sent to
the rogue IdP. The rogue IdP then redirects the client to the honest IdP
that has the same client_id. If the user is already logged
on at the honest IdP, then the authentication may be skipped and a code
is generated and returned to the client. Since the client was
interacting with the rogue IdP, the code is sent to the rogue IdP’s
token endpoint. At the point, the attacker has a valid code that can be
exchanged for an access token at the honest IdP. See OAUTHSEC for a
detailed description of the attack.
This attack is mitigated by the use of OpenID Connect hybrid flow in
which the honest IdP’s issuer identifier is included as the value of
iss or JARM where the
iss included in the response JWT. On receiving the
authorization response, the client compares the iss value
from the response with the issuer URL of the IdP it sent the
authorization request to (the rogue IdP). The client detects the
conflicting issuer values and aborts the transaction.
Various mechanisms in this specification aim at preventing access token phishing, e.g., the requirement of exactly matching redirect URIs and the restriction on response types that do not return access tokens in the front channel. As a second layer of defense, FAPI Security Profile 1.0 advanced clients use RFC 8705 meaning the access token is bound to the client’s TLS certificate. Even if an access token is phished, it cannot be used by the attacker. An attacker could try to trick a client under his control to make use of the access token as described in FAPISEC (“Cuckoo’s Token Attack” and “Access Token Injection with ID Token Replay”), but these attacks additionally require a rogue authorization server or misconfigured token endpoint.
For the “Access Token Injection with ID Token Replay” attack, the attacker tricks a client under his control to start a normal authorization flow to obtain an authorization response with an ID Token. The ID Token is replayed along with a phished access token at the token endpoint (which is misconfigured in the client to point to an attacker-controlled URL). The attacker then gains access to resources of the honest resource owner through the client.
Misconfigured endpoints are mitigated by using metadata in the authorization server’s published metadata document as defined in OIDD or RFC 8414.
ID Token replay can be mitigated by requiring the
at_hash in the token endpoint’s ID Token response to verify
the validity of the access token.
In RFC 6749 the authorization request and responses are not integrity protected. Thus, an attacker can modify them.
In RFC 6749, the authorization request is sent as a query parameter. Although RFC 6749 mandates the use of TLS, the TLS is terminated in the browser and thus not protected within the browser; as a result an attacker can tamper the authorization request and insert any parameter values.
The use of a request object or request_uri
in the authorization request will prevent tampering with the request
parameters.
The IdP confusion attack reported in SoK: Single Sign-On Security – An Evaluation of OpenID Connect is an example of this kind of attack.
This attack occurs when the victim and attacker use the same RP client. The attacker is somehow able to capture the authorization code and state from the victim’s authorization response and uses them in his own authorization response.
This can be mitigated by using OpenID Connect hybrid flow where the
c_hash, at_hash, and s_hash can
be used to verify the validity of the authorization code, access token,
and state parameters. It can also be mitigated using JARM by verifying
the integrity of the authorization response JWT.
The server can verify that the state is the same as what was stored in the browser session at the time of the authorization request.
As confidential information is being exchanged, all interactions shall be encrypted with TLS (HTTPS).
Section 7.1 of FAPI Security Profile 1.0 - Part 1: Baseline shall apply, with the following additional requirements:
Only the cipher suites recommended in BCP 195 shall be permitted.
For the authorization_endpoint, the authorization
server may allow additional cipher suites that are permitted by the
latest version of BCP
195, if necessary to allow sufficient interoperability with users’
web browsers or are required by local regulations.
NOTE: Permitted cipher suites are those that BCP 195 does not explicity say “MUST NOT” use.
For JWS, both clients and authorization servers
PS256 or ES256 algorithms;RS256); andnone.For JWE, both clients and authorization servers
RSA1_5 algorithm.To achieve the full security benefits, it is important the implementation of this specification, and the underlying OpenID Connect and OAuth specifications, are both complete and correct.
The OpenID Foundation provides tools that can be used to confirm that an implementation is correct:
https://openid.net/certification/
The OpenID Foundation maintains a list of certified implementations:
https://openid.net/developers/certified/
Deployments that use this specification should use a certified implementation.
An attacker could prepare an authorization request URL and trick a victim into authorizing access to the requested resources, e.g. by sending the URL via e-Mail or utilizing it on a fake site.
OAuth 2.0 prevents this kind of attack since the process for obtaining the access token (code exchange, CSRF protection etc.) is designed in a way that the attacker will be unable to obtain and use the token as long as it does not control the victim’s browser.
However, if the API allows execution of any privileged action in the course of the authorization process before the access token is issued, these controls are rendered ineffective. Implementers of this specification therefore shall ensure any action is executed using the access token issued by the authorization process.
For example, payments shall not be executed in the authorization process but after the client has exchanged the authorization code for a token and sent an “execute payment” request with the access token to a protected endpoint.
This profile requires both clients and authorization servers to
verify payloads with keys from the other party. The authorization server
verifies request objects and private_key_jwt assertions.
The client verifies ID Tokens and authorization response JWTs. For
authorization servers, this profile strongly recommends the use of JWKS
URI endpoints to distribute public keys. For clients this profile
recommends either the use of JWKS URI endpoints or the use of the
jwks parameter in combination with RFC 7591 and RFC 7592.
The definition of the authorization server jwks_uri can
be found in RFC 8414,
while the definition of the client jwks_uri can be found in
RFC 7591.
In addition, this profile
jwks_uri endpoints shall be served over
TLS;x5u and
jku should not be used; andkid.The use of RFC 8705 for client authentication and sender constraining access tokens brings significant security benefits over the use of shared secrets. However in some deployments the certificates used for RFC 8705 are issued by a certificate authority at an organization level rather than a client level. In such situations it may be common for an organization with multiple clients to use the same certificates (or certificates with the same DN) across clients. Implementers should be aware that such sharing means that a compromise of any one client, would result in a compromise of all clients sharing the same key.
JWK sets should not contain multiple keys with the same
kid. However, to increase interoperability when there are
multiple keys with the same kid, the verifier shall
consider other JWK attributes, such as kty,
use, alg, etc., when selecting the
verification key for the particular JWS message. For example, the
following algorithm could be used in selecting which key to use to
verify a message signature:
kid that matches the kid
in the JOSE header;alg,
use, kty, or crv that corresponds
to the message being verified.There are many factors to be considered in terms of privacy when implementing this document. However, since this document is a profile of OAuth and OpenID Connect, all of them are generic and applies to OAuth or OpenID Connect and not specific to this document. Implementers are advised to perform a thorough privacy impact assessment and manage identified risks appropriately.
NOTE: Implementers can consult documents like ISO/IEC 29100 and ISO/IEC 29134 for this purpose.
Privacy threats to OAuth and OpenID Connect implementations include the following:
policy_url or by other means can be inappropriate.These can be mitigated by choosing appropriate options in OAuth or
OpenID Connect, or by introducing some operational rules. For example,
“Attacker observing personal data in authorization request” can be
mitigated by either using authorization request by reference using
request_uri or by encrypting the request object. Similarly,
“Attacker observing personal data in authorization endpoint response”
can be mitigated by encrypting the ID Token or JARM response.
This specification adds the following values to the “JSON Web Token Claims” registry established by RFC 7519.
(informative)
The following are non-normative examples of various objects compliant with this specification, with line wraps within values for display purposes only.
The examples signed by the client may be verified with the following JWK:
{
"kty": "RSA",
"e": "AQAB",
"use": "sig",
"kid": "client-2020-08-28",
"alg": "PS256",
"n": "i0Ybm4TJyErnD5FIs-6sgAdtP6fG631FXbe5gcOGYgn9aC2BS2h9Ah5cRGQpr3aLLVKCRWU6
HRfnGseUBOejo57vI-kgab2YsQJSwedAxvtKrIrJlgKn1gTXMNsz-NQd1LyLSV50qJVEy5l9RtsdDzOV
8_kLCbzroEL3rc00iqVZBcQiYm8Bx4z0G8LYZ4oMJAG462Mf_znJkKXsuSIH735xnSmx74CC8TOe6G-V
0Wi_wVSJ9bHPphSki_kWUtjVGcnyjYuQVE0LRj3qrGPAX9bsVKSqs8T9AM41TB9oV5Sjz5YhggwICvvC
CGwil9qhUoQRkeXtWuGCfvCSeTdawQ"
}The examples signed by the server may be verified with the following JWK:
{
"kty": "RSA",
"e": "AQAB",
"use": "sig",
"kid": "server-2020-08-28",
"alg": "PS256",
"n": "pz6g0h7Cu63SHE8_Ib4l3hft8XuptZ-Or7v_j1EkCboyAEn_ZCuBrQOmpUIoPKrA0JNWK_fF
eZ2q1_26Gvn3E4dQlcOWpiWkKmxAhYCWnNDv3urVgldDp_kw0Dx2H8yn9tmFW28E_WvrZRwHEF5Czigb
xlmFIrkniMHRzjyYQTHRU0gW3DRV9MrQQrmP71McvfLPeMBPPgsHgLo7KmUBDoUjsgnwgycEOWPm8MWJ
13dpTsVnoWNIFQqVNz1L5pRU3Uoknl0MGoE6v0M9lfgQgzxIX9gSB1VGp5zZRcsnZGU3MFpwBhOWwiCU
wqztoX0H5P0g7OWocspHrDn6YOgxHw"
} eyJraWQiOiJjbGllbnQtMjAyMC0wOC0yOCIsImFsZyI6IlBTMjU2In0.eyJhdWQiOiJodHRwczpcL1wv
ZmFwaS1hcy5leGFtcGxlLmNvbVwvIiwibmJmIjoxNTk0MTQwMDMwLCJzY29wZSI6Im9wZW5pZCBwYXlt
ZW50cyIsImlzcyI6IjUyNDgwNzU0MDUzIiwicmVzcG9uc2VfdHlwZSI6ImNvZGUgaWRfdG9rZW4iLCJy
ZWRpcmVjdF91cmkiOiJodHRwczpcL1wvZmFwaS1jbGllbnQuZXhhbXBsZS5vcmdcL2ZhcGktYXMtY2Fs
bGJhY2siLCJzdGF0ZSI6IlZnU1VJRW5mbG5EeFRlMXZBdHI1NG8iLCJleHAiOjE1OTQxNDAzOTAsIm5v
bmNlIjoiN3hEQ0h2aXVQTVNYSklpZ2tIT2NEaSIsImNsaWVudF9pZCI6IjUyNDgwNzU0MDUzIn0.VSo5
VWN3lOiCry2KItU5RI62i9KG2KQlBdpsDT0DI0vSMK-q85aJZvsMiHBNBv1PQ9qAWmU3oJS-yi-Ks_lD
lP6lIMFrOL_Ym3VxJ_SM6lrc8JSZH_nNx6sqxPpeMQTF4SFPx30vHrlBVJaCGfnCMVC6Nbzwef0vOEpN
ixZT-9cwa3dZ-pddAyt58dKGxS76NR_wxdBaSKN0AfPoui0HSSaAkIdRds21NKIOf4r9BjV5lr1Oi-4I
JUQp-xdeLCPD3fD6Y-TJbHFToJ4FsQzglN83BfNYaeXV_yTtK7yeSw2R-ee0b3uMV0iD1ee77b7bbcjR
3msLISFjM40d9Pv8qQwhich when decoded has the following body:
{
"aud": "https://fapi-as.example.com/",
"nbf": 1594140030,
"scope": "openid payments",
"iss": "52480754053",
"response_type": "code id_token",
"redirect_uri": "https://fapi-client.example.org/fapi-as-callback",
"state": "VgSUIEnflnDxTe1vAtr54o",
"exp": 1594140390,
"nonce": "7xDCHviuPMSXJIigkHOcDi",
"client_id": "52480754053"
} eyJraWQiOiJzZXJ2ZXItMjAyMC0wOC0yOCIsImFsZyI6IlBTMjU2In0.eyJzdWIiOiIxMDAxIiwiYXVk
IjoiNTI0ODA3NTQwNTMiLCJjX2hhc2giOiJRUjJ6dWNmWVpraUxyYktCS0RWcGdRIiwic19oYXNoIjoi
OXM2Q0JiT3hpS0U2NWQ5LVFyMFFJUSIsImF1dGhfdGltZSI6MTU5NDE0MDA5MCwiaXNzIjoiaHR0cHM6
XC9cL2ZhcGktYXMuZXhhbXBsZS5jb21cLyIsImV4cCI6MTU5NDE0MDM5MCwiaWF0IjoxNTk0MTQwMDkw
LCJub25jZSI6Ijd4RENIdml1UE1TWEpJaWdrSE9jRGkifQ.Z-LpQRuYoiTqEBfVfctn-e6bLwSMqi8wA
3TuARGW6GyD05gPF6TVlUwHgJnSUlhETrzhEUAKKiyGDxGspuBU0OAnB4qepgrEBizk980NjCEVXNkog
v0ANv9VX_01Lcl0d_6_c-AUjwDSuKY8rDfvggKSJFzRilbQuB8b1drAIAZpc6kMObY3PcQZ_vKTMsQ8l
HCuXXRuAo__0xRE6l_iiRCos_940GrJr0Sih9uTQpnCWBoEab1dC0l-vUp4lP0TQRKNpDoPoMOj10KJA
8T8pKhjZ8TKM-wo9A4qH2LBgUIYJyjd8bWfKTZxCNmLRzRr-_JBG7fF_fpOUhGT_DhzMwwhich when decoded has the following body:
{
"sub": "1001",
"aud": "52480754053",
"c_hash": "QR2zucfYZkiLrbKBKDVpgQ",
"s_hash": "9s6CBbOxiKE65d9-Qr0QIQ",
"auth_time": 1594140090,
"iss": "https://fapi-as.example.com/",
"exp": 1594140390,
"iat": 1594140090,
"nonce": "7xDCHviuPMSXJIigkHOcDi"
} eyJraWQiOiJjbGllbnQtZW5jLTIwMjAtMDgtMjgiLCJjdHkiOiJKV1QiLCJlbmMiOiJBMjU2R0NNIiwi
YWxnIjoiUlNBLU9BRVAtMjU2In0.LFvxFCzJ-1NRl48pXTUs8f2axm5MRe9Cv0dgV6sXTRKwkT3nC2SJ
QlutOol36VARLd3uaIoj4Z7LVV_MrdIYYvDci2WLlKSlI_NRgR3qJ25N3S6fCqNEYRgDDbNzSr15MDRc
WQR5Jdl3VP8g748cowD_2gaopaCzZWTa3r_J2VOEETfcBAIMX0NbtVA3hHW-rQ0aCC7UIbP0_oEB2YF0
u6qAXCXuC02nO6coMSpSHTDZwkqkmFiFEKERM_Gayz3lVddlgfcPR2k76bCUjWy934-rOrOBGcLyS1Ww
aTIqMUS3WEIsAwCDr1Jt4pAioryRLZfLmWNff4QZSBxWejRqpw.uRANzseIWYB9YeAW.sJGqF2ERkMEE
jm8h62tUA4UeZIBqvVRpkQqjTuae7-4ac-4sSth0A3zeERvlyC5GcP0W2tj7uxMi0I4gpN33OfAOR-tA
9E_47oCHXrOH-7cpLgVIxxWZFx43dhxUh5QHuBfli4nHErMVUsFq6CzQj8Z5SHvBD2Qx3suPEeCNo_M2
woohCprwjOKhE-Q_VkWUJb-Elrq9HxJcBtadw0spolqgYYTIWvV4fcKmbtGANYLac29oKWd5-jyDAsSF
FZrSCNxv-BtJUiUVWUn5eVufjJYCx62Ju-MZ8vsPNTE-_I5em9RTBja6ylcivjzhW9Ncl6yKVfnB0XJN
cSSHQSFhc6Gvy7oYMBXx1C5G31OsiklkKQX2gsAZlxFQ_X25AXpMoV8-5xsUwdMdTaPxIIsccbrK2dfA
aP0rUruSV8zrlrbsN3ftjTJSka2XGG3kra76EPAlzSwxy6XdFVtEV31hirV3f9g04Gj_e-Q7J7HR62eY
3_09WyARShQL3DVXWOcK_8YrLr58JjNAbm0s5dAUq-zt9cMv8rl05t_dE59Gi6Hnl2YAiRdYG6B71FxJ
CE2Uqciy2jLe6mCDFDfqkog4G5R9FzNz5VzhVpmZVm3OJkug-UzayN7nwZ7jsmxQ2ucCM03xq-0MLdsk
H-cleahkFw5S-W40cn5hLrRXSqUoYfKmVSd9RltOZ6T0VrYpw2LaF2uUYEO9w9bMmg2zzfxft4WHsEbD
OlJVb5SE8mUjzBBZAcgaHYSv0Wii70lEJvLSdnVI1r9kuu9ae_j1Tu08RVyFGfgixYjI9z2L_sc8uOoO
HJ-Tq1iuncL3lCQJBuwBFoxyINlFgz4YV2AgreNsX8bDfE9XbRB9TnfvSd6rmes9lO0-3VQFlsC0C5dx
VXgp5o05E8nisPwuLmlGO5BTtBzCQ3tIH2SuTLTG-gohTEUVn4fACwIiyuXdPXcF4GxJNRNgNOH7xwxx
55qEM0xl2GuSseV59FiZR-WKMMs.kScy0JLB4XECklDAwTIVNAwhich when decrypted using the following key:
{
"kty": "RSA",
"d": "OjDe8EkZXgvB-Gy5A4EdU8fBuAjdHLMyHKAtMaS_W_joEJHDvZRhIYbh1jAyHYoR3kFMXu
tCIYpRjDrsUEhjYuVKLm90CVtysoRjjkiXyupcEW3o--X_HBJhKm1Y-0I7LQ-cA7CotJpTVMR2fRTqP1
T4FsORAjg9l-fbdpVmeDiZBRbL2zCWmKWhtDpHyy7vbSCRghntihz_M5Hrchk7r8ito_K3dFrV9IZSF9
RoEY7kyK5bL36Kpgai44PYCzqOzqP2fteO_rZ9fn-uK59pI3ySo_PgSbJ55n14Nd9Z8m70zE9Z4aIeND
EFspZUhavngRwc7MuJ7f_hVGQ9RFbbkQ",
"e": "AQAB",
"use": "enc",
"kid": "client-enc-2020-08-28",
"n": "jVc92j0ntTV0V1nwZ3mpGaV2bME4d6AMS2SRrJBM0fLehaTEqDNzGu0warz2SC9bhcBOB5
_q3mYBFjmTwWzSbsk6RYETnAgViXg67PgH7Vkx2NCtwgQW3cNdnUZWRNYHsoevkx_Ta1X6Vi9ulebU_B
CKjrF-6CjVcGgEsO_S5DKcukGHdf81WlQOq3zGQg4h7MLArrbPSTHHORDsu_87qY9m2EhiYSOBSF5rHs
fDo7zWI5FWNG-_HO-CBM005bykIIS1aXCXx1jOW1OrKcp5xv3e-BR6MJTxncZJ4o1GtynJI8kLXRgltL
ArSOkbzNEr9GjU9lnSSxKLMtRLKkG2Ow"
}has the following body:
{
"sub": "1001",
"aud": "2334382354153498",
"acr": "urn:cds.au:cdr:2",
"c_hash": "BLfy9hvQUZTDq6_KmF4kDQ",
"s_hash": "9s6CBbOxiKE65d9-Qr0QIQ",
"auth_time": 1595827190,
"iss": "https://fapi-as.example.com/",
"exp": 1595827490,
"iat": 1595827190,
"nonce": "7xDCHviuPMSXJIigkHOcDi"
} eyJraWQiOiJzZXJ2ZXItMjAyMC0wOC0yOCIsImFsZyI6IlBTMjU2In0.eyJhdWQiOiI0NjkxODA2NDgw
MzkwNTEiLCJjb2RlIjoiendrR2FjOWp1TFg4RjhmcmFwRElTaTNLMkZ3bG40cXh3eWZOSUkzQ2p6MCIs
ImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOlwvXC9mYXBpLWFzLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tXC8iLCJzdGF0ZSI6IlZnU1VJRW5mbG5E
eFRlMXZBdHI1NG8iLCJleHAiOjE1OTQxNDEwOTB9.k_3df0dIDX6watKxQkzAHOLgf4FBi_xIPN-n8aT
5hMX3gaBbeDqdUA5NR764L4ugdDgXyQm8dNcZrZldKIPfSfRcjBTtSx9PEdiffn_xUkwnS18YNAfEoq0
HjvkOQ59F21ImKn113kon00uC2dqBGByRrZcaUYOnvW2DdHCVA0VTW2je5nzbI02z9csLa8uGGGwjWRP
Ec9j9bvR1Adc2m2Z-o0QCRIBl81sZz6_AnE-wPTw-KZFQBs3FgS-r0FDYOzE7FHIMgDBSKAg1J5tWY3J
wRuIv_oAbYdSlxdYzrbFQ9grX4MA0p7pk5lS-kwnN845GZ2k1_yaOLtYYyvRFrwwhich when decoded has the following body:
{
"aud": "469180648039051",
"code": "zwkGac9juLX8F8frapDISi3K2Fwln4qxwyfNII3Cjz0",
"iss": "https://fapi-as.example.com/",
"state": "VgSUIEnflnDxTe1vAtr54o",
"exp": 1594141090
} eyJraWQiOiJjbGllbnQtMjAyMC0wOC0yOCIsImFsZyI6IlBTMjU2In0.eyJzdWIiOiI1MjQ4MDc1NDA1
MyIsImF1ZCI6Imh0dHBzOlwvXC9mYXBpLWFzLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tXC9hcGlcL3Rva2VuIiwiaXNzIjoi
NTI0ODA3NTQwNTMiLCJleHAiOjE1OTQxNDAxNTEsImlhdCI6MTU5NDE0MDA5MSwianRpIjoiNHZCY3RN
U2tLNHdmdU91aTlDeWMifQ.h3i0k2DWc7V6WEiinHAsse-pOFiWxe5kD4KetdGX65Q03orj0Fh6EWfdE
AntCrOodUsypKjM1ia3evbQmsSkhIb4YK5s53hYYtEbJC_eG9jFnVc4ki7Qc5O-1K-D80w7WT1UI--Ih
Ku-i22Ai_nMed-71UWLHcPi7W20SCroPHXfaLiFj_TOsr7I8h7VNsoa7P3-coHlXT5q4cMjIA7t8cRag
sGtKlIgwdFYySlimtSESDM0U-_NUPperTgnF8FVn7SqtizBJneZNAWwSLJD9AVsnMOH6kOeNLtpopsru
Dcs54S_aIlroP-BdiHw9R1qRTIVSoX3k_EStvoWSf8NcQwhich when decoded has the following body:
{
"sub": "52480754053",
"aud": "https://fapi-as.example.com/api/token",
"iss": "52480754053",
"exp": 1594140151,
"iat": 1594140091,
"jti": "4vBctMSkK4wfuOui9Cyc"
}(informative)
The following people contributed to this document:
(informative)
This section is to be removed before publication
-11
Copyright (c) 2026 The OpenID Foundation.
The OpenID Foundation (OIDF) grants to any Contributor, developer, implementer, or other interested party a non-exclusive, royalty free, worldwide copyright license to reproduce, prepare derivative works from, distribute, perform and display, this Implementers Draft, Final Specification, or Final Specification Incorporating Errata Corrections solely for the purposes of (i) developing specifications, and (ii) implementing Implementers Drafts, Final Specifications, and Final Specification Incorporating Errata Corrections based on such documents, provided that attribution be made to the OIDF as the source of the material, but that such attribution does not indicate an endorsement by the OIDF.
The technology described in this specification was made available from contributions from various sources, including members of the OpenID Foundation and others. Although the OpenID Foundation has taken steps to help ensure that the technology is available for distribution, it takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this specification or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights. The OpenID Foundation and the contributors to this specification make no (and hereby expressly disclaim any) warranties (express, implied, or otherwise), including implied warranties of merchantability, non-infringement, fitness for a particular purpose, or title, related to this specification, and the entire risk as to implementing this specification is assumed by the implementer. The OpenID Intellectual Property Rights policy (found at openid.net) requires contributors to offer a patent promise not to assert certain patent claims against other contributors and against implementers. OpenID invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents, patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to practice this specification.